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Abstract
Presentism faces a serious challenge from truthmaker theory. Standard solu-
tions to the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed in one of two
ways. Easy road presentists invoke new entities to satisfy the requirements
of truthmaker theory. Hard road presentists, by contrast, flatly refuse to
give in to truthmaker demands. Recently, a third way has been proposed.
This response seeks to address the truthmaking problem by tensing our
truthmaker principles. These views, though intuitive, are under-developed.
In this paper, I get serious about a fundamentally tensed approach to truth-
making by sketching out the underlying ontological picture needed to make
sense of tensed truthmaker theory.
1 Introduction
According to presentism, only present entities exist; past and future entities do
not. According to truthmaker theory, truth depends upon ontology; truth is not
a primitive feature of reality. It has been argued that presentism is at odds with
truthmaking. The problem lies with claims about the past. Such claims are true
and yet, because past entities do not exist, their truth cannot be connected to
ontology by the usual means, in the normal way.
Asay and Baron (2014) maintain that just two roads lay before the presentist:
the easy road and the hard road. The easy road presentist capitulates to the de-
mands of truthmaker theory.1 Accordingly, she typically inflates the ontology of
the present with new kinds of entities (e.g. properties, abstract objects, relations,
memories in God’s mind and so on) drafting them into doing truthmaking work.2
The road is easy because it does not force one to take issue with truthmaker theory
itself. The easy road can be summarised as follows:
Easy Road Presentism
1Fellow travellers include Bigelow (1996), Bourne (2006), Cameron (2011), Crisp (2007) and
McKinnon and Bigelow (2012).
2By ‘ontology of the present’ I mean: anything that exists now, along with any abstract
objects one might be willing to countenance.
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1. Claims about the past are true.
2. The truth of claims about the past depends on presently existing entities.
3. Truthmaker theory is not restricted for claims about the past.
The hard road presentist refuses to capitulate. For her, truth is, sometimes,
a primitive feature of reality; not all truths must be truthmade. The challenge
of the hard road is to motivate and defend a restriction on truthmaker theory
of the appropriate kind.3 The road is hard because it forces one to take up arms
against standard maximalist truthmaker theory, which has benefited from a pretty
formidable defense in recent times (see, for instance, Cameron (2008) and Arm-
strong (2004)). Hard road presentism can be summarised thus:
Hard Road Presentism
1. Claims about the past are true.
2. The truth of claims about the past does not depend on presently existing
entities.
3. Truthmaker theory is restricted for claims about the past.
The distinction between the hard and easy roads, though useful, is not exhaus-
tive.4 For there is a third road: the middle road to presentism. The middle road
presentist maintains that we can fully accommodate the truth of claims about the
past without calling up new existing entities to do truthmaking work, and with-
out restricting truthmaker theory either. Middle road presentism can therefore be
summarised as the combination of claim (2) from hard road presentism with claim
(3) from easy road presentism:5
Middle Road Presentism
1. Claims about the past are true.
2. The truth of claims about the past does not depend on presently existing
entities.
3Asay and Baron (2014) attribute the hard road to Tallant (2009). Sanson and Caplan (2010)
and Merricks (2007) also seem to hold this view. Critics include Kra¨mer (2010), Sider (2003, p.
185) and Heathwood (2007).
4In a recent paper, Baron (forthcoming) inverts the terminology: the hard road is the easy
road and vice versa. I deploy Asay and Baron’s (2014) terminology here, as I believe it more
accurately captures the broad dialectical situation: defending a restriction on truthmaker theory
is a much more challenging task than that of providing truthmakers for claims about the past.
5Kierland and Monton (2007), Baia (2012), Goff (2010) and Smith (1999) all suggest such a
picture.
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3. Truthmaker theory is not restricted for claims about the past.
Middle road presentism is a ‘have your cake and eat it too’ kind of view. It
is, therefore, apt to collapse into the easy or hard roads in a stiff breeze. Current
middle road presentists defend the view by arguing that we can tense the entire
truthmaking project and that, once we do, it is easy to satisfy truthmaker theory
under presentism without forcing existing entities in the present to do truthmaking
work for claims about the past (see, for instance, Kierland and Monton (2007) and
Baia (2012)). To be clear: not all middle road presentists adopt a tensed approach
to truthmaking.6 My target, however, is the tensed version of the middle road,
and so henceforth it is to that position that I will refer when speaking of middle
road presentism.
My goal here is not to defend the middle road so conceived. It is, rather, to get
clear on what, exactly, the ontological picture underlying middle road presentism
might be, and to get clear on how this notion of tensed truthmaking is supposed
to work. I begin by putting pressure on the proponent of the middle road to say
more about the relationship between truth and ontology that underlies a tensed
approach to truthmaking, identifying a key challenge that must be met (§2). I go
on to consider four ways of addressing the challenge, arguing that each is unsat-
isfactory (§3–4). Following this, I propose a hybrid solution to the challenge (§5),
one that combines elements from three of the four views considered in §3–4, before
arguing that the solution is an intelligible, presentist position. I briefly defend the
claim that the middle road view is distinct to the hard and easy road versions of
presentism (§6) and close by suggesting that something like the presentist position
developed here will be necessary for developing an adequate version of the middle
road (§7).
2 The Challenge
As noted, middle road presentists typically advocate a tensed approach to truth-
making. This involves taking standard truthmaker principles and reformulating
those principles in a fundamentally tensed manner. So, for instance, consider
what is, arguably, the weakest truthmaker principle (advocated by Lewis (2001)
and Bigelow (1988)). I use here Lewis’s (2001) formulation:
(SP) For any proposition <p> and any worlds W and V , if <p> is true in
W but not in V , then either something exists in one of the worlds but not in
the other, or else some n-tuple of things stands in some relation in one of the
6For instance, the Meinongian presentist discussed in §4 does not.
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worlds but not in the other. (Lewis 2001, p. 612).
To tense truthmaker theory, we replace (SP) with one of the following:
(QBSP) Truth supervenes on things, how things are, and the past about things
and how things were. (Kierland and Monton 2007, p. 490)
(Presentist TSB) For any worlds W1 and W2, let ψ be the proposition that
something exists in one world but not the other, or else some object instanti-
ates a property or a relation in one world but not the other. For any proposition
P , if P is true in W1 but not in W2, then ψ or WAS(ψ) or WILL(ψ).
7 (Baia
2012, p. 349)
The middle road presentist goes on to argue that presentism is well-placed to
satisfy tensed truthmaker principles of the above kind. In order to satisfy these
principles, there is no need to call the past into existence. Rather, these princi-
ples require only that the past existed. Because all presentist agree that the past
existed, the core ontology of presentism is no bar to satisfying truthmaker the-
ory. Which is to say that presentism is compatible with tensed truthmaker theory
because the presentist can allow that claims about the past depend on the past,
on ‘how things were’ (henceforth, this will be my phrase for that aspect of the
past that truth is supposed to depend upon), even though the past does not exist.
Baia, for instance, explicitly takes this line when he writes:
... that there were dinosaurs depends on past dinosaurs in the following sense:
No worlds differ in whether that there were dinosaurs is true without also dif-
fering in whether dinosaurs existed. (Baia 2012, p. 349)
Tensing truthmaker theory is a central component of middle road presentism:
it is key to the view. For by doing so, one can accept the core middle road
claims: namely that propositions about the past are true, that truthmaker theory
is unrestricted and that the truth of claims about the past does not depend on
the present existence of any entities (it depends on entities that existed). But is
tensing our truthmaker principles the end of the story? I am not convinced, for
we can still ask: how, exactly, do truths about the past depend upon how things
were, given that the past does not exist? Middle road presentists warn against
asking such questions: truth depends on how things were, they say, and that is
a primitive relationship, one that resists further investigation. I, for one, cannot
help myself: what does it mean to say that truth depends on how things were?
7‘WAS’ and ‘WILL’ are primitive, non-truth functional tense operators.
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We can say the words, but the words must paint an ontological picture and, for
me at least, the picture offered thus far is painfully indistinct.
To animate the problem, consider again the hard road presentist. As noted,
hard road presentists propose a restriction on truthmaker theory for claims about
the past. But they typically go on to say things that sound very much like middle
road presentism. Tallant (2009, p. 423), for instance, maintains that although
propositions about the past do not depend upon ontology and thus lie beyond
the scope of truthmaker theory, such claims are nevertheless true in virtue of how
things were in the past; they are true in virtue of the past existence of truthmakers.
Merricks (2007, p. xiii), another hard roader, makes a similar suggestion but, like
Tallant, is clear that his proposal is to treat truths about the past as lying beyond
the scope of truthmaker theory.
What we see then in the literature is something quite puzzling. Both the hard
road presentist and the middle road presentist claim that propositions about the
past are true because of how things were. However, the hard roader takes this
to be equivalent to a restriction on truthmaker theory, while the middle roader
takes this to be a broadening or reimagining of truthmaker theory. In order for
the middle road position to be a genuinely distinct position, then, we need to
know why the view is not simply the same old restriction on truthmaker theory
being pushed on us by the hard roader. That requires an account of exactly how
truthmaker theory gets satisfied and by what. If it is ‘how things were’ that is
doing the work well and good but some account is required of what that means,
otherwise it is unclear what the solution is supposed to be.
Here’s another way to put the general point. What it is for a principle to be
a truthmaker principle is for it to connect truth to ontology in a metaphysically
robust manner. Merely stating a tensed principle and claiming that it is a truth-
maker principle is therefore not enough. We need to know how truthmaking work
is being done according to that principle. Put in difference-making terms: a dif-
ference in truth-value between worlds ought to correspond to a difference in the
ontology of the two worlds. It is not obvious, however, what kinds of differences we
might be tracking when talking about differences in how things were. Presumably,
the tensed truthmaker theorist will tell us that we are tracking tensed differences
between worlds. For instance, a world in which <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is
true differs from a world in which <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is false in the
following tensed respect: in the first world, Caesar crossed the Rubicon whereas,
in the second world, Caesar did not cross the Rubicon.
On its own, however, that is not very illuminating. For it is just to state that
there are tensed ontological differences between worlds that track differences in
truth-value for claims about the past, differences that a tensed truthmaker princi-
ple adequately captures. The nature of these differences has not been explained,
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and so the broad ontological picture remains unclear. Moreover, our usual onto-
logical pictures won’t do. We cannot understand differences in how things were
as differences in what exists or in the relations/properties that are instantiated,
for that will collapse middle road into easy road presentism. We must, rather,
understand differences in how things were as differences in what existed and the
properties/relations that were instantiated between worlds, where that is some-
thing completely new.
So middle roaders must explain the relationship between truth and ontology
proposed by a tensed approach to truthmaking. If this cannot be done, then I’m
afraid we cannot view tensed principles such as (QBSP) or (Presentist TSB) as
genuine truthmaker principles. At best, they look to be ways of capturing the
same restriction on truthmaker theory underlying the hard road to presentism.
Alternatively, if an account of the relationship between truth and ontology under-
lying these principles can be provided, but only at the cost of invoking presently
existing entities of some kind, then the middle road will collapse into the easy
road.
Of course, the challenge here is premised on the idea that we should take truth-
maker theory metaphysically seriously, as a way of connecting truth up to ontology.
Some middle road presentists may therefore wish to sidestep the challenge by ‘de-
flating’ truthmaking, giving up on the idea that we should take truthmaker theory
seriously in this sense. In the following section, I provide some considerations
against this deflationary move. This will motivate a more inflationary attitude to
be discussed in §4–5.
3 Deflationism
Both hard and easy road presentists accept that truthmaker theory brings with it
substantial ontological commitments. I suspect that for some, however, the tensed
approach to truthmaker theory is supposed to require no such heavy-duty ontolog-
ical posturing. When we say that <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is true because
Caesar crossed the Rubicon we are saying something painfully obvious that must
be true and that does not require any further ontology to render it sensible. Baia
(2012, p. 349) seems to take this line when he writes of (Presentist TSB):
It is key that, in defending [Presentist TSB], the presentist can hold that the
truth of a proposition can depend on how the world was or will be ... without
thereby being ontologically committed to merely past or future things.
Presentist TSB, then, is supposed to be ontologically light-weight. More generally,
the middle road to presentism is supposed to be easy, as easy as Tarski’s truth-
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schema. The connection to the T-schema is apt, especially in the context of a
deflationary theory of truth. Deflationary theories of truth hold, roughly, that all
there is to say about truth is captured by the Tarskian truth-schema:
T <p> is true iff p.
Truth so understood is also supposed to be metaphysically light-weight. The T-
schema does not invite a metaphysics of truth of the robust kind offered by, say,
correspondence theorists, who maintain that truth is a matter of correspondence to
reality. As a corollary, truth understood via the truth schema is incapable of doing
substantive metaphysical work in, say, facilitating the development of objections
against a metaphysical theory.
A similar story might be told for tensed truthmaking. Perhaps all there is
to say about tensed truthmaking is captured by the following tensed ‘truthmaker
schema’:
Tense For any claim about the past, <ψ>, <ψ> is true because ψ.
Where ‘because’ here is some kind of primitive sentential operator, one that ex-
presses a syntactic relationship of priority between ψ and <ψ>. Once we have laid
out the truthmaker schema, so the thought goes, we have said all there is to say
about truthmaking in this domain. The tensed truthmaker schema does not invite
a robust ontological interpretation of the sort demanded in the previous section.
As a corollary, truthmaking so understood is incapable of doing any substantive
metaphysical work in, say, facilitating the formulation of a truthmaker objection
against presentism.
It is, perhaps, the Tense-schema and the associated deflationary attitude that
proponents of (QBSP) and (Presentist TSB) are groping for. It would certainly
explain the puzzlement that they tend to express when I ask them to explain the
underlying ontology behind the tensed truthmaking approach, an approach taken
to be so straightforward as to border on the inane.
The deflationary take on the tensed truthmaker approach can be formulated
into a much more general thesis about truthmaking. All there is to truthmaking
is the following generalised truthmaker schema:
TM For any claim <φ>, <φ> is true because φ.
Truthmaking is, on this view, as metaphysically uninteresting as truth and cer-
tainly cannot do any real work; there are no viable truthmaker arguments in
metaphysics.
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If deflationism about truthmaking were a viable option, then matters would
be easy indeed for the middle road presentist. All she would have to do is quote
the Tense-schema or the TM-schema and off she goes. I seriously doubt, how-
ever, that deflationism is a useful way forward, for three reasons. First, it is
very difficult to see what the subsantive difference between the T-schema and the
TM/Tense-schemas really amounts to. If the TM/Tense-schemas just are Tarskian
truth-schemas, however, then, as Asay and Baron (2014, p. 14) have argued, they
are not truthmaker principles at all, just because the T-schema isn’t. So appeal-
ing to these schemas does nothing to reconcile presentism with truthmaker theory.
Second, even if the TM/Tense-schemas are distinct to the T-schema, the defla-
tionary approach to truthmaking, at least as applied to the past, appears to imply
that truths about the past make no substantive ontological demands. They do
not, that is, require a story about the underlying metaphysics that coheres with
the tensed truthmaker approach. But then the view sounds exactly like the hard
road to presentism: the view according to which claims about the past do not
depend upon anything. The middle road to presentism so understood would not
be a genuine alternative to positions already on offer.
Perhaps that is unfair: truth does depend on being on the deflationary ap-
proach to truthmaking. It is just that the very notion of ‘dependence on being’
is far thinner, metaphysically speaking, than we realise. Indeed, exactly where
the proponent of hard road presentism goes wrong is in taking the dependence of
truth on being as a metaphysically substantive claim, one that must be rejected in
order to save presentism. That is a mistake, says the proponent of the deflationary
approach to truthmaking; stop taking metaphysics so seriously!
This brings us to the third problem with the deflationary approach: truth-
maker theory is not obviously open to deflation. When we say that truth depends
on ontology we mean something metaphysically robust by this claim. As Asay
and Baron (2014, p. 14) argue, this is evidenced by the kinds of debates that go
on in the truthmaking literature, and the seriousness with which those debates
are treated. If truthmaker theory is deflated then all of the substantive issues
in truthmaker theory seem either completely mysterious or else trivial to solve.
It is, for instance, hard to see how we could have a substantive debate about
the metaphysics of truthmakers – about what truthmakers really are – once the
dependence of truth on ontology has been stripped of metaphysical import. Sim-
ilarly, debates about the nature of the truthmaker relation – how exactly it is
that we should understand the dependence at issue – appear just as pointless if
truthmaking is metaphysically light-weight. Or consider the problem of negative
existentials: one of the chief difficulties for maximalist truthmaker theories. This
problem now seems utterly trivial to solve. Why is <there are no unicorns> true?
Well, because there are no unicorns of course!
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We can extend Asay and Baron’s central insight a bit further: the deflation
of truthmaking would not only make a mystery of truthmaker debates, it would
also have substantial ramifications elsewhere. Truthmaking is supposed to give
us a grip on issues to do with realism and anti-realism, constituting a framework
for developing those debates (Asay 2012). It is also supposed to provide a way to
catch metaphysical cheats: those who invoke dubious ontologies (Armstrong 2004;
Sider 2001). To ‘deflate’ the dependence of truth on being is to set deflationism
loose throughout these other areas of metaphysics. Suddenly realist and anti-
realist debates appear metaphysically light-weight, at least when framed in terms
of truthmaking. Moreover, cheats caught via such deflationary means would be
easily set free: why care about someone’s cheating when that person’s diagnosis
as a cheat falls out of something that should not really be doing any substantial
metaphysical work? Finally, because the operative notion of ‘dependence’ in the
claim that truth depends on being crops up in a number of places in metaphysics,
deflating it here is likely to force a deflationary attitude to whole swathes of the
metaphysical enterprise.
To deflate truthmaking in the above way, then, is really to deny truthmaker
theory and to step outside of the entire truthmaker project. It is also likely to
require a very general deflationary attitude toward metaphysics. Now nothing I
have said rules that out: one can certainly develop a metaphilosophical stance of
this kind to get presentism out of trouble. But that would seem an incongruent
thing to do, especially for a presentist. Presentism is built on the foundations of
metaphysical seriousness. I worry then that deflationism about truthmaking is
contrary to the very spirit of presentist metaphysics.
4 Modified Ontology
This brings us back to a more ontologically inflationary approach to the middle
road. Such an approach faces the challenge outlined at the end of §2: namely, to
provide some account of what it means to say that truth depends on how things
were. While I believe it is possible to make sense of this idea, doing so ultimately
requires endorsing an ontological picture that, when first met, can seem quite
bizarre. Moreover, the picture can seem unmotivated, since it might be thought
that there are (by comparison) more sedate ontologies already available that would
do just as well.
Instead of jumping straight to the positive proposal, then, I need to ease us into
it. I will do this by canvassing three broad ontological pictures already available
in the literature that one might be naturally inclined to use when developing
an understanding of middle road presentism. I will argue in each case that the
ontological picture being painted is unsatisfactory. To be clear: I will not be
Sam Baron Forthcoming in Erkenntnis
arguing that these accounts are implausible simpliciter, I lack the space for such
a detailed critique. I will, rather, be arguing only that these accounts, at least as
presented by their proponents, are not up to the task of supporting the middle
road.
Note that this section is not merely an attempt to clear the way for the positive
proposal in §5, though it is certainly that. Rather, by focusing on the reasons why
these three ontological pictures are unsatisfactory, we can begin to triangulate a
piece of negative space in which a satisfactory account of the ontology of middle
road presentism must ultimately fit. This, in turn, will make the positive proposal
easier to grasp, since it will be tailored to occupy the space so defined, and will be
partially illuminated by its neatness of fit.
4.1 The Brute Past
The most natural place to start is with Kierland and Monton’s (2007) brute past
presentism, since it is perhaps the first version of middle road presentism to recog-
nise the challenged outlined in §2. Kierland and Monton claim that the truth of
propositions about the past depends on ontology in this sense: those propositions
depend on past being, where past being is a sui generis ontological category. Of
this category, they write:
The past is an aspect of reality, but it cannot be reduced to things or the
properties they possess (i.e., how things are) ... what is the past? It is what
has happened: what things existed and how they were. But what is that? To
ask that question is to presuppose that the past must be explainable in other
terms. And that presupposition may simply be false. (Kierland and Monton,
p. 491)
Kierland and Monton call this category of past being ‘the brute past’. Note that
the brute past is not reducible to the sum total of past entities that, under non-
presentism, exist but which, under presentism, do not. Note also that the brute
past has a particular shape; a kind of structure, one that describes a total world
history. It is the shape of the brute past that is ultimately responsible for truths
about the past. A world in which <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is true and a
world in which <Caesar crossed the Rubico> is false differ with respect to the
shape of the brute past. It is by attending to historical evidence that we come to
know what shape the past has (Kierland and Monton 2007, pp. 492–493).
So far so good. The Kierland and Monton line gets into trouble, however, when
they say that while:
... the [brute] past is a fundamental aspect of reality ... we are willing to say
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that the [brute] past is a present aspect of reality. (Kierland and Monton 2007,
pp. 496–597)
As Caplan and Sanson (2011, p. 202) argue, this admission forces Kierland and
Monton into a dilemma. Either the brute past is what really happened, or it is
not. If the brute past is what really happened, then it is implausible to hold that
the brute past is a present aspect of reality. It would seem, rather, to be a past
aspect of reality. For a present aspect of reality is how things are now, and cannot
be plausibly understood as somehow constitutive of how things were. At best, a
present aspect of reality might ‘stand in’ for the past, by representing past entities,
or otherwise standing proxy for them. But it cannot itself constitute the past. If,
however, the brute past is not what really happened – that is, does not constitute
the past – but, rather, is just some extra aspect of present reality – some extra
entity, say, or some extra property – that stands in for the past then the Kierland
and Monton view fails to be a version of middle road presentism. For what the
view really amounts to is this: there is a single, primitive aspect of the present
that exists and that makes claims about the past true. Such a view has all of the
hallmarks, and faces all of the troubles of the easy road to presentism.
The dilemma Caplan and Sanson raise is a serious one. But I do not think
we should be too quick to throw out the Kierland and Monton line. For there
is a key insight within the approach that must be recognised. The insight is
this: to fully satisfy a tensed truthmaker principle we need to attribute some,
positive ontological status to the past. For if the past is nothing at all ontologically
speaking, then there will be no way to make sense of tensed truthmaking, which
is supposed to connect truth to things that used to exist, and that used to possess
properties. Kierland and Monton recognise this, and seek to ‘beef up’ the past
by treating it as a sui generis ontological category. Where they go wrong is in
treating the past as a present aspect of reality, since that calls it into existence.
Still the difficulty Kierland and Monton face is instructive, for it partially reveals
what is required to make the middle road succeed: the past must be included in
the presentist’s ontology. But how?
4.2 Meinongianism
Here’s one option: Meinongianism. Meinongians draw a distinction between being
and existence, a distinction I have thus far ignored. According to the Meinongian,
non-existent entities are a part of being. Being therefore outruns existence. At
the formal level, this is usually modelled by treating existence as a predicate, Ex.
Thus ‘there exists something such that’ is: ∃x(Ex ∧ ... x ...) and ‘all existing
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things are such that’ is: ‘∀x(Ex → ... x ...)’ (Priest 2003, pp. 4–5).8 Meinongian
presentism takes on the distinction between being and existence and holds that
there are past things that do not exist. Past entities, properties, relations and so
on are, on this view, some (albeit thin) addition to being.9
On this view, it is the non-existent things that are responsible for the truth
of claims about the past. The ontological difference between a world in which
<Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is true and <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> is false
is that a world in which the proposition is true is one in which Caesar is crossing
the Rubicon, in the past, even though he does not exist, whereas a world in which
the proposition is false is one in which Caesar is not crossing the Rubicon in the
past.
The Meinongian presentist gains all of the ontological resources available to
the non-presentist when it comes to truthmaking, without the ontological cost
in existing things. To be sure, there is an ontological cost to be paid of some
order: an outlay on non-existent entities is required. But, arguably, that is a cost
worth paying, since by doing so it is possible to attribute the past some positive
ontological status, without thereby calling the past fully into existence. The result
is an ontological picture of reality that is fit for truthmaking.
Set aside the various difficulties with positing non-existent entities, and with
making sense of the distinction between things that exist and things that just are.
The real trouble with Meinongian presentism is that it demotivates the tensed
aspect of the tensed approach to truthmaking. For if we are allowed to accept that
past entities are, even though they do not exist and to then use these non-existent
entities for truthmaking purposes, then we can formulate an entirely tenseless
truthmaker theory that takes, as input, things that ‘are’ in the Meinongian sense,
and connects those up to truth using something like (SP) (Keller (2004, pp. 89–91)
makes this point).10 This, however, would make a mystery out of the middle road
presentist’s insistence that tensing our truthmaker principles is key to the success
of middle road presentism.11
So Meinongian presentism won’t do, at least if we are to take the ‘tensed’
8For a Meinongian semantics see Routley (1980).
9Something like Meinongian presentism is defended by Hinchliff (1996) as ‘unrestricted pre-
sentism’.
10(SP) itself will not do: it requires supervenience on existing things. It can, however, be
modified to require supervenience on things that have being.
11Note that Kierland and Monton (2007, p. 495) explicitly reject the Meinongian interpreta-
tion.
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aspect of middle road presentism seriously.12 Again, however, the Meinongian
picture contains a key insight. As noted, the middle road must attribute some
positive ontological status to the past. Calling the past into existence won’t do.
But then it would seem that the only option is to draw a Meinongian distinction
between the existence of the past and past being. With such a distinction in hand,
one can increase the ontological status of the past, without increasing it too much.
As noted, standard Meingonian presentism demotivates the tensed truthmaker
enterprise. So we need a new way of thinking about the distinction between
existence and being that does not have this outcome. A useful way forward is
to appeal to something like ontological pluralism, which is the third putative way
of understanding the ontology of the middle road, and which I will now discuss.
4.3 Tensed Ways
Ontological pluralists appeal to the ancient notion that there are different kinds
of existence. Turner (2010) develops the distinction between ways of existing in a
rigorous way, via pluralism about basic quantifiers. For each notion of existence,
existence1 ... existencen, there is a distinct, semantically basic quantifier ∃1...∃n.
The ∃n quantify over things that exist in each of the relevant ways. If a pink ball
exists in the exists1 way, then: ∃1x(Bx&Px), if it exists in the exists2 way, then:
∃2x(Bx&Px) and so on. Examples of things that might exist in different ways
include: abstract versus concrete objects; fundamental versus non-fundamental
objects and mind-dependent versus mind-independent objects.
Ontological pluralism is controversial but, for now at least, set aside the difficul-
ties facing such a view.13 Rather, assuming that ontological pluralism is sensible,
we can go on to differentiate between different ways of existing in time. By taking
tense very seriously we can say that past, present and future entities all exist in
different ways and, moreover, change their existential category with the passage
of time. We can, that is, differentiate between existence in the pastish way ∃A;
the presentish way ∃P and the futurish way ∃F .14 This gives us a unique take on
the metaphysics of time and, more importantly for present purposes, furnishes us
with a way to understand the ontological picture underlying tensed truthmaker
principles.
To see this, consider again (Presentist TSB):
12Another option might be to adopt Baron’s (2014) priority presentism. Priority presentism
gives the past a positive ontological status, by imbuing it with a lower grade of existence. Priority
presentism is insensitive to tense, however, in that it requires no tensed truthmaker principles,
and so will demotivate the tensed aspect of the middle road in the same manner as Meinongian
presentism.
13For defense, see McDaniel (2009) and Turner (2010)
14See McDaniel (ms.) for defense of this idea.
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(Presentist TSB*) For any worlds W1 and W2, let ψ be the proposition that
something exists in one world but not the other, or else some object instantiates
a property or a relation in one world but not the other. For any proposition
P , if P is true in W1 but not in W2, then ψ or WAS(ψ) or WILL(ψ).
To make sense of this principle as a genuine truthmaker principle, we interpret it
using the three different kinds of existence represented by the semantically primi-
tive quantifiers ∃A, ∃P and ∃F to yield:
(Presentist TSB*)
For any worlds W1 and W2:
1. Let α be the proposition that something existsA in one world but not the
other, or else some object instantiatesA a property or a relation in one world
but not the other
2. Let β be the proposition that something existsP in one world but not the
other, or else some object instantiatesP a property or a relation in one world
but not the other
3. Let δ be the proposition that something existsF in one world but not the
other, or else some object instantiatesF a property or a relation in one world
but not the other
4. For any proposition P , if P is true in W1 but not in W2, then α or β or δ.
We can do the same for (QBSP) to yield:
(QBSP*) Truth supervenes on what existsA, what existsP and what existsF
and on which properties are instantiatedA, instantiatedP and instantiatedF .
Where, in both cases, the different ways of existing bleed off into different kinds of
instantiation. For each way things can be, there is an associated way for properties
and relations to be instantiated (denoted by subscripts for property instantiation
in the principles above).
Truthmaker principles so understood are straightforward. The difference in
ontology between worlds that corresponds to a difference in the truth-value of
claims about the past is just a difference in what existsA and/or differences in
whatever properties/relations are instantiatedA. In so far as we can make sense
of different kinds of existence and, what’s more, different ways of existing in time,
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then it looks like we have a coherent account of tensed truthmaking. Unfortunately,
the picture of temporal ontology so painted, though intelligible, is not presentism;
at least, not as we know it. Indeed, McDaniel (ms.) takes it to be a version of the
‘moving spotlight’ theory. To be sure, past entities do not exist in the same way
present entities exist: they existA, as opposed to existingP . And, granted, these
are fundamentally distinct kinds of existence. But the past still exists and that is
contrary to the basic tenets of presentism.
Still, as with the previous strategies for understanding middle road presentism,
the ontological pluralist approach preserves a key insight. If we are to take a
tensed approach to truthmaking seriously, then it is not enough to simply tense
our truthmaker principles. Rather, we must push tense right down into the basic
ontology. For if we do not, then the resulting picture of truthmaking will be one
in which some tenseless ontology is making true claims about the past. But then
it is very difficult to see why any tensed truthmaker principle would be required: a
standard tenseless one will do. This is exactly the problem facing the Meinongian
view above. So what we need is something like the pluralist machinery for tenses,
but that does not trade on tensed notions of existence per se.
5 Tensed Being
In the previous section, I considered three options for developing the middle road.
This discussion revealed three core ontological aspects that such a view should
have:
1. The past must be attributed some positive ontological status.
2. A distinction must be drawn between existence and being for the past.
3. Tense should be injected into the basic ontology.
By combining elements from each of the three views considered above, we can
produce a version of presentism that possesses features (1)–(3) just mentioned.
First, following Kierland and Monton, we begin by attributing some positive on-
tological status to the past. Second, just as the Meinongian presentist draws a
distinction between existence and being, we draw a similar distinction, applying it
to the past: the sense in which the past has a positive ontological status is just
that it has being, but does not exist. Of course, we cannot follow the Meinon-
gian in maintaining that there are past things, at least where the ‘are’ here is
understood tenselessly. So this brings us to the third aspect: tense is taken onto-
logically seriously. However, rather than differentiating between different kinds of
existence: past existence (existenceA); present existence (existenceP ) and future
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existence (existenceF ), we differentiate between different kinds of being, thereby
tensing the basic ontology of Meinongianism. On this view, there is present being
(things that are now); past being (things that were); and future being (things that
will be). Each kind of being is distinct, constituting its own ontological category.
Each kind of being is fundamental. Existence, on this view, is univocal: things
either exist or they do not; being, by contrast, is tripartite, it comes in at least
three flavours.
Call the combination of these three elements: Tensed Being Presentism (TBP).
The view is, if you like, a kind of deep ontological pluralism: rather than endorsing
pluralism about existence, it endorses pluralism about being (appropriately cleaved
from existence), cutting it along tensed lines. TBP naturally avoids the difficul-
ties facing each view considered in the previous section. It avoids the dilemma
facing Kierland and Monton’s view because while the past is treated as a distinct
ontological category it is not treated as a present aspect of reality. To do so would
be to annihilate the fundamental distinction between past and present being that
TBP upholds. Similarly, TBP avoids the apparent redundancy of tensed truth-
maker principles experienced by the Meinongian, because tense is treated as a
fundamental aspect of ontology, something that our truthmaker principles ought
to respect. Finally, TBP injects tense into basic ontology without calling the past
into existence as the ontological pluralist does, and so does not obviously flout the
core tenets of presentism.
In a moment I will argue that TBP is an intelligible, presentist position. For
now, let us grant that the notion of past being is sensible. With this notion in
hand, we can return to the challenge against middle road presentism voiced in §2.
That challenge, it will be recalled, is to explain the relationship between truth
and ontology that underlies tensed truthmaker theory in a way that preserves
middle road presentism. To do this, we need (at a minimum) an account of the
ontological differences that track truths about the past. According to TBP, the
relevant differences are just those that have already been suggested: they are
differences in how things were. But we now have a better sense of what that
means: a difference in how things were is a difference in past being, where past
being is a fundamental ontological category, one that is fundamentally distinct to
present being. By satisfying tensed truthmaker theory in this way, TBP is well-
positioned to recover the core claims of middle road presentism. First, because
tensed truthmaker principles are completely satisfied by past being, TBP does not
force any restrictions on truthmaker theory. It can therefore satisfy claim (3) in
the summary of middle road presentism provided in §1. Moreover, TBP satisfies
truthmaker theory without holding that the truth of claims about the past depends
on existing entities, so claim (2) is also satisfied. Finally, claims about the past
are true, which gives us claim (1).
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Now, I admit that this is all very schematic. To put just a little flesh on
the bones of TBP I need to do two things. First, I need to show that TBP can
capture the core presentist thesis that only present entities exist. Second, I need
to say more about what, exactly, the primitive category of past being is, and how
we should understand it, lest I be charged with making a mystery out of tensed
truthmaking. Note that, in order to carry out the first task, I will deploy a bit
of technical machinery. My use of the technical machinery is primarily to provide
a language in which to state the core presentist thesis that only present entities
exist, so that the compatibility of this thesis with TBP can be drawn out.
Let us begin, then, by representing the distinction between past, present and
future being with a new kind of quantifier. Ontological pluralists introduce differ-
ent kinds of existential quantifiers to do similar work at the level of existence. The
standard Meinongian strategy would be to take these quantifiers and then differ-
entiate between being and existence via the existence predicate. Proceeding that
way would make the position I am outlining quite similar to ontological pluralism,
formally speaking. Since I believe that the difference between the views is greater
than the similarity in formalism would suggest, I will, instead, introduce a ‘being’
quantifier, a ‘beifier’: ∃B. The difference between ∃B and ∃ lies primarily with the
domain. ∃B ranges over a domain of entities that possess being, not all of which
need to exist. ∃, by contrast, ranges over existing entities.
Just as for each tensed way of existing some ontological pluralists posit a se-
mantically primitive tensed existence quantifier – ∃A, ∃P , ∃F – for each tensed
way of being there is a tensed beifier – ∃BA for past being, ∃BP for present being
and ∃BF for future being. Each beifier ranges over a distinct domain of entities,
corresponding to a different kind of being. Universal beifiers can be introduced in
the ordinary way for quantifiers via the singular beifier plus negation, e.g.:
1. ¬∀BAx a` ∃BAx¬
2. ∀BAx a` ¬∃BAx¬
Note that implication does not necessarily carry across tensed beifiers. It is not
always the case, for instance, that ∃BAxΨx → ∃BPxΨx for any Ψ (where Ψ is a
predicate variable), though this may hold in some cases. Other than that, beifiers
behave as normal quantifiers within their given domain. By associating names
with domains of being via a subscript we can carry out beifier generalisation: e.g.
PaA ` ∃BAxPx, as well as universal instantiation for any universal beifier: e.g.
∀BAxPx ` PaA and so on. What we cannot do is generalise or instantiate out
of beifiers across domains. So, for instance: PaA 0 ∃BPxPx. That’s because the
domains are distinct.
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The condition that all and only present entities exist can be stated using the
present beifier and the property of existence, represented by the existence predi-
cate ‘Ex’, as follows:
3. ∃x( ... x ...) ↔ ∃BPx(Ex ∧ ... x ...)
4. ∀BPxEx
Sequent 3 tells us that only present entities exist, sequent 4 tells us that all present
entities exist. Together, sequents 3 and 4 represent the core thesis of presentism.
TBP has the capacity to uphold both sequents. Because TBP draws a distinction
between being and existence, it is free to spread existence where it likes. Accord-
ingly, it throws existence over everything that has present being, thereby upholding
4. Similarly, because TBP draws a distinction between different kinds of being,
and because it allows that existence and being come apart, it is not forced to
place existence onto past or future being. Instead, it happily restricts existence to
present being only. So TBP upholds 3. Because TBP upholds both claims, it is a
genuinely presentist view.
One might disagree: with regard to the tensed existential quantifiers ∃A, ∃P
and ∃F it is always possible to introduce a global quantifier, ∃ and stipulate that
∃x( ... x ... ) a` ∃Ax( ... x ... ) ∨ ∃Px( ... x ... ) ∨ ∃Fx( ... x ... ). One can
then claim that tensed existential quantifiers are nothing more than restrictions of
∃. So too can one introduce a global beifier ∃B and stipulate that ∃Bx( ... x ... )
a` ∃BAx( ... x ... ) ∨ ∃BPx( ... x ... ) ∨ ∃BFx( ... x ... ). In the case of tensed
quantifiers – and, indeed, in the case of ontological pluralism more generally – the
presence of the global quantifier might be thought to pose a problem. For if there
is such a global quantifier and if the tensed quantifiers are just restrictions of the
global quantifier, then this may seem to have ontological import: there really is
only one kind of existence and that is represented by ∃. The tensed quantifiers are
not genuinely distinct kinds of existence, they are simply ways of carving up the
domain of existing things. So too you might think that because we can stipulate
the global beifier ∃B, there is really only one kind of being. The other tensed
beifiers are just different ways of cutting up this total domain. If that were so, one
might argue, then it would be very difficult to restrict existence to only present
entities, since it is the robust distinction between kinds of being that facilitates
such a restriction. TBP would not be a presentist view after all.
This worry and others like it have already been dealt with by proponents
of ontological pluralism, and so I will be brief (see Turner 2010, pp. 13–21).
The key to the issue is conceptual priority. Beifiers, as I am using them here,
merely represent and so render perspicuous an underlying ontological picture, one
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according to which there are three distinct categories of being. Beifiers do not
determine the underlying picture of reality; the picture of reality is conceptually
prior to the language we use to describe it. Indeed, it is the picture that motivates
the division between beifiers, and it is the picture that the language is ultimately
aiming to track. So while we can certainly introduce new quantifiers into our
language that enable us to talk about all three kinds of being at once, disjunctively,
we should resist the idea that this tells us anything about reality, or else be charged
with reading metaphysics off the structure of a language. This is just to say that
merely being able to introduce a global beifier does not reveal anything deep. Of
course, one could take a different view, treating ontology as the business of getting
the quantifiers straight. But I take a ‘metaphysics first’ approach, and for good
reason. As Dyke (2008) has argued, taking a ‘language first’ approach opens one
up to serious methodological problems.
You might wonder, then, why I have spent any time at all on the beifiers. Well,
note that a metaphysics first approach does not imply that formal languages have
no place, it merely suggests that we should not attempt to ‘read off’ ontology
from the structure of such languages. The metaphysics first approach allows that
we can learn a lot by modelling the structure of reality formally. We can render
structural connections precise that may be only dimly imagined prior to such
formalisation. Ultimately, though, the formal work is being pressed into the service
of an underlying view of ontology and not vice versa. At any rate, that is the
spirit in which I have used the language above: TBP is a presentist view because
it upholds an ontology that is accurately represented by a formally stated version
of the core presentist thesis. The language helps us to reveal TBP’s presentist
credentials, but does not determine that TBP has those credentials.
The formal machinary is important for another reason. It is indispensable for
adequately expressing the view I am developing. When talking about the domains
of past or future being, it is hard not to slide into use of tenseless language, saying
things like ‘the domain of past being is the domain of things that were x’. This ‘is’
makes it sound as though the tenseless Meinongian ‘are’ considered in §4 underlies
the ontological picture being painted. But it is, strictly speaking, a mistake to
say that the domain of past being ‘is’ anything in the tenseless sense, but it is
also necessary to say such things when using English. The formal machinary will,
ultimately, replace this way of talking, providing a fundamentally tensed way to
talk about things in the domain of past being.
For instance, a very natural thing to say is that the domain of past being ‘is’
constituted by things that used to exist, or that the domain of future being ‘is’
constituted by things that will exist. I understand the relationship between tensed
beifiers and tensed existence statements as follows. If ∃BAxPx, then it follows that
there existed something that used to possess property P. Similarly if ∃BFxPx then
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it follows that there will exist something possessing P . We can sharpen this up
through the use of tense operators. Using WAS and WILL to represent sentential
tense operators for ‘it was the case that’ and ‘will be the case that’ respectively, we
can translate statements of the form ‘x existed’ as WAS(∃x ... ) and statements
of the form ‘x will exist’ as WILL(∃x ... ). The relationship between beifiers and
tensed existence statements then is:
5. ∃BAx( ... x ... ) ↔ WAS(∃x( ... x ... ))
6. ∃BFx( ... x ... ) ↔ WILL(∃x( ... x ... ))
which, together, express a relationship between past/future being and present be-
ing that can be unpacked via the relationship between ∃BP and ∃ to yield:
7. ∃BAx( ... x ... ) ↔ WAS(∃BPx(Ex ∧ ... x ...))
8. ∃BFx( ... x ... ) ↔ WILL(∃BPx(Ex ∧ ... x ...))
More generally, then ‘the domain of past being is the domain of things that were
x’ becomes: ∀BAx(WAS(Ψx)).
Obviously, being able to say things about past being in the language of beifiers
does not let me off the hook with respect to the provision of a metaphysics for TBP.
It is therefore incumbent on me to say a bit more about the ontological picture
I am trying to paint. This returns us to the second aspect of TBP previously
slated for development: what does it mean to say that past, present and future
being are distinct ontological categories? More carefully: given that entities in the
domain of past being do not exist and given that there ‘are’ no past entities in the
Meinongian sense of ‘are’ (the ‘are’ used by Meinongian presentism), what is the
domain of past being supposed to be?15
Here’s my first pass answer to this question: the domain of past being is the
domain of things that were. Suppose you press me: what does it mean to say
that the domain of past being is the the domain of things that were? Rather than
provide an independent analysis of this notion and thus of what it is to fall within
the domain of past being, I prefer, in the first instance, to turn the question back.
What does it mean to say that there ‘are’ things in the ordinary, non-Meinongian
sense of being, used by non-presentists, the one that is typically connected to
‘existence’? Either there is an answer to this question, or there is not. If there is
no answer to this question, then we should not expect an answer to the question
15A similar question can be asked of future being. Everything I say below can be applied to
future being as well. See fn. 13.
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of what it means to say that something was. If there is an answer to this question,
then whatever that answer is I can tense it and deploy it as an analysis of what it
is to fall within the domain of past being.
For example, suppose one claims that what it means for something to be is for
that thing to possess causal powers. Then I will say: what it means for something
to have been is for that thing to have possessed causal powers. The domain
of past being corresponds to things that used to be powerful (∀BAx(WAS(Px)).
Alternatively, suppose one claims that to be is to be concrete. Then I will say:
to have been is to have been concrete. The domain of past being is populated
by the formerly concrete things (∀BAx(WAS(Cx)). If one continues to press the
question with regard to the analysis of past being then, at each step, I will turn
the question back. Unless analyses can be produced ad infinitum there will be a
point in this to and fro at which one must accept that there is no further analysis
available of what it is to be: being is at some level a primitive notion. However, if
being is at some level a primitive notion, then the same can be said for past being:
past being is at some level a primitive notion and, as such, admits of no further
analysis.
Whatever our views about being in the non-Meinongian sense, then, we have
an account of past being available, one that is every bit as good as our account
of what it is to be. Suppose, however, one offers an analysis of being as follows.
What it means for something to be is for that thing to be located in spacetime.
If that is the correct analysis, then you might think there is no tensed version. It
makes no sense to speak of something that used to be in spacetime. For that is
to inject an unwanted tensed aspect into the notion of spacetime, perhaps even
suggesting that spacetime itself is located in a higher temporal dimension.
Fortunately, however, this analysis of being will not do. If what we mean by
being is tied up with location within spacetime, we thereby rule out any metaphys-
ical view that takes entities outside of spacetime seriously, like Platonism (which
countenances the existence of abstract entities) or dualism (which countenances
the existence of non-physical entities). Now, it may well be that these views are
implausible on independent grounds, but they are not to be ruled out given what
we mean by ‘being’. Similar considerations sink other apparently ‘untensable’ pro-
posals. Indeed, there is, I believe, a general moral here: an analysis of being that
is untensable also tends to be overly restrictive. So much the worse for untensable
accounts of being.
I therefore offer the following as a positive characterisation of past being. At
the most general level, the domain of past being is a domain of non-existent enti-
ties that used to possess the property of existence. We can gain a further grasp on
this domain by comparing it to the domain of fictional entities. Fictional entities
are, like past entities, non-existent entities. However, fictional entities never used
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to exist. We can use the double contrast with existence and fictional entities to
give a statement of past being as follows:16
A is the domain of past being = df (i) ∀BAx(WAS(Ex ... ∧ ... )), (ii) ∀BAx¬Ex
and (iii) ∀BAx(¬FICT(Ex)).
Where FICT is a story operator, which reads: according to the fiction..., and
where the elipses in (i) represent further conditions to be added as needed (e.g.
concreteness).
In sum, past being is (1) the result of conceptually combining Meinongianism
and ontological pluralism; (2) definable by taking the definition of present being
and tensing it and (3) further characterisable via the twin contrast with existence
and fictional non-existence. That gives us a pretty good grasp on the notion, one
that is at least as good as our grasp on present being. So past being is intelligible.
Because I have already shown that TBP upholds presentism, it follows that TBP
is an intelligible presentist position.
6 Back to the Easy Road?
I have claimed that TBP is a genuine middle road view, one that is distinct to the
hard and easy roads. But is that right? Here’s one reason to worry. In a recent
paper, Baron (forthcoming) argues that (what I have called) the hard road to
presentism collapses into easy road presentism. The basic argument is this. Con-
sider the proposition: <Suzy knows that dinosaurs existed>. Suppose it is true.
Intuitively, this is a claim about the present. Accordingly, hard road presentists
are forced to admit that it possesses a truthmaker; an entity that necessitates its
truth. Knowledge, however, is factive. So the truth of <Suzy knows that dinosaurs
existed> necessitates the truth of <dinosaurs existed>. By the transitivity of ne-
cessitation, then, the truthmaker for <Suzy knows that dinosaurs existed> also
necessitates the truth of <dinosaurs existed>. Consequently, the hard road pre-
sentist is committed to the existence of some entity, E, that necessitates the truth
of a claim about the past, P . The trouble is that the only options for understand-
ing what E might be are precisely the options that the easy road presentist has
available to her for providing truthmakers for claims about the past. It follows,
then, that a hard road presentist must call upon the same kinds of entities – tensed
properties, abstract objects, memories in God’s mind and so on – as the easy road
16For future being: F is the domain of future being = df (i) ∀BFx(WILL(Ex ... ∧ ...)) (ii)
∀BFx¬Ex and (iii) ∀Bx(¬FICT(Ex)).
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presentist, and so the hard road boasts no advantages over the easy road.17
Now, note that the middle road presentist also accepts that <Suzy knows that
dinosaurs existed> can be true. So it would seem that she, too, is committed to
some entity E that necessitates the truth of such a proposition. If the only options
available to the middle road presentist for understanding E are the same as those
available to the easy road presentist, then middle road presentism will, like hard
road presentism, collapse into easy road presentism. An unwelcome result indeed.
Fortunately, however, the middle road presentist has another option available to
her, an option that is not available to an easy road presentist, and TBP helps
us to see that. The easy and hard road presentists are forced to say that E is
some presently existing entity. As Baron notes, E will (probably) be a complex
consisting of an appropriately formed mental state M possessed by Suzy, along
with T : a tensed property, abstract object, memory in God’s mind and so on. The
middle road presentist, by contrast, can maintain that E is not a purely present
entity, it is a complex consisting of an appropriately formed mental state M plus
an aspect of past being, B, namely whatever it is that, according to TBP, grounds
the truth of <dinosaurs existed>. In this way the middle road presentist holds a
similar view to the non-presentist. A non-presentist will also maintain that what
necessitates the truth of <Suzy knows that dinosaurs existed> is an appropriately
formed mental state M plus whatever it is that grounds the truth of dinosaurs
existed. The difference is that what grounds the truth of <dinosaurs existed> for
a non-presentist is an existing entity, whereas for the middle road presentist it is
something that does not exist, but that ‘has’ past being.
The middle road presentist, then, can escape Baron’s argument. This brief
discussion has been instructive. For what it shows is that if Baron’s argument
is sound, then the only two live options available for addressing the truthmaker
objection against presentism are the easy and middle roads. That makes the
development of the middle road position outlined here all the more important.18
7 Conclusion
I recognise that there is a lot more to do. TBP demands a thorough explication
and defense and I cannot hope to carry out that project in this paper. Instead,
I will close by noting that something like TBP will be required to render middle
road presentism successful, and so the burden does not lie with me alone. For
consider that features (1)–(3) mentioned at the beginning of §5, the very features
17Baron’s argument is a version of an argument presented by Jago (2012) against non-
maximalist solutions to the problem of negative existentials.
18Things may be worse still: Baron (2013) has also argued that the easy road fails. So the
middle road option may be the only viable way forward for the presentist.
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that TBP is tailor-made to capture, are each individually necessary for accommo-
dating genuinely tensed truthmaking. First, if the past is attributed no positive
ontological status, then tensed truthmaker principles cannot be counted as ways
of developing truthmaker theory, since the world will not be holding up its end of
the relationship between truth and ontology that those principles propose. Sec-
ond, if no distinction is drawn between existence and being, then there will be no
way to attribute some positive ontological status to the past, without calling it
into existence. And third if tense is not injected into the basic ontology, then the
tensed aspect of truthmaker theory will be otiose.
Now, it may be that there is some other view – a view that is not TBP – that
can capture these three features. I cannot rule that out. However, it is likely to
deploy a very similar core ontology to TBP, and so is likely to be controversial in
exactly the same ways. For any such view will require a fundamental distinction
between existence and some x, where x is a kind of positive ontological status.
Such a view will also require that x be fundamentally tensed, in order to justify
the use of tensed truthmaker principles to handle truths about it. The necessity
of TBP, or something like it, for developing a middle road presentism that takes
tensed truthmaking seriously is important. For as noted in §1, my central goal in
this paper is to reveal the underlying ontological picture needed to make sense of
middle road presentism so conceived. That goal has been met: TBP is the answer.
It is now up to the middle road presentist to give the view a solid defense.
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